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Abstract
As millions of users flock to online social networks, sites
such as Facebook and Twitter are becoming increasingly
attractive targets for spam, phishing, and malware. The
Koobface botnet in particular has honed its efforts to ex-
ploit social network users, leveraging zombies to gen-
erate accounts, befriend victims, and to send malware
propagation spam. In this paper, we explore Koobface’s
zombie infrastructure and analyze one month of the bot-
net’s activity within both Facebook and Twitter. Con-
structing a zombie emulator, we are able to infiltrate the
Koobface botnet to discover the identities of fraudulent
and compromised social network accounts used to dis-
tribute malicious links to over 213,000 social network
users, generating over 157,000 clicks. Despite the use
of domain blacklisting services by social network oper-
ators to filter malicious links, current defenses recognize
only 27% of threats and take on average 4 days to re-
spond. During this period, 81% of vulnerable users click
on Koobface spam, highlighting the ineffectiveness of
blacklists.
1 Introduction
In recent years, online social networks have exploded in
popularity. Today, sites such as Facebook and Twitter
attract nearly 500 million members combined [7, 16],
each allowing users to share photos, stories, and dissem-
inate links. Implicit to the interactions within a social
network is the notion of trust; users create relationships
with their friends and valued media outlets, in turn re-
ceiving access to content generated by each relationship.
On the heels of the widespread adoption of social net-
works, phishing and malware attacks have become a reg-
ular occurrence [8, 14], exploiting the trust users place
in their friends.
Of the multitude of attacks appearing in social net-
works, the Koobface botnet in particular has evolved into
a sophisticated infrastructure honed at exploiting social
networks [4]. Leveraging its zombie arsenal, the Koob-
face botnet automates the creation of new social net-
working accounts used to befriend unsuspecting users,
in turn spamming enticing links that redirect to malware.
Victims that fall prey to the social engineering attack
witness their own social networking accounts turn into
vehicles for sending spam to the victim’s friends, while
the victim’s machine is repurposed into a zombie.
In this paper, we explore Koobface’s recent spamming
activity and analyze how Koobface evades defenses im-
plemented by social networks to prevent the spread of
malware. To accomplish this task, we develop a zombie
emulator that safely interacts with the Koobface C&C to
acquire work loads without any risk of propagating mal-
ware. Over a month long infiltration, we discover over
1,800 compromised hosts and the identities of 4,100
zombies subverted by Koobface to serve malware. In
addition to monitoring C&C activity, we identify 942
fraudulent Facebook accounts generated by Koobface
and 247 infected Twitter accounts which were used to
send malicious links to over 210,000 users, generating
over 157,000 clicks.
Despite signs that Koobface spam is becoming less
frequent, the current phase of remission is not due to
protections put in place by social networks. Monitoring
blacklists used by social networks to identify Koobface’s
malicious links, we find even the best blacklist identifies
only 26% of links, requiring on average 4 days between a
link being spammed to its subsequent blacklisting. Dur-
ing this period of delay, we find 81% of visitors to Koob-
face’s spam occur within the first 2 days of a link being
posted, leaving the majority of social networking users
vulnerable. Paired with Koobface’s use of URL obfusca-
tion which can completely evade existing blacklist tech-
niques, social networks remain largely undefended from
the threat of Koobface.
2 Background
As the ingenuity of spammers continues to evolve, un-
solicited messages have expanded beyond email and
into social networks, posing a novel threat that re-
mains largely unexplored. Earlier studies into bot-
nets have targeted infiltration for improving email spam
detection [15], identifying the hosting infrastructure
of scams [3], understanding the economic motives of
spam [10], and determining what information is stolen
from infected machines [18]. While these studies form a
foundation for botnet infiltration, they exclusively target
systems that rely on email propagation.
Where traditional email spam relies on access to bulk
lists of email addresses, social network spam requires
the creation of fake user accounts or compromising ex-
isting accounts. Without access to relationships with
other users, a message cannot be propagated. The chal-
lenge of a successful spam campaign in social networks
is thus two fold: obtaining enough accounts to carry
out a campaign before the accounts are suspended and
enough URLs to evade filtering. The Koobface botnet
in particular has matured to address both of these chal-
lenges.
In an attempt to stem the spread of spam, social net-
work operators have implemented a number of safety
measures that include using URL blacklisting services
to identify and delete suspicious URLs, constructing
heuristics to identify malicious activity and suspend the
offending account, and blocking the IP addresses of re-
peated abusers [19, 12, 17]. Despite the array of de-
fenses, social networks continue to be targeted by suc-
cessful spam campaigns.
Given Koobface’s impact on social networks, a num-
ber of researchers have previously studied the botnet,
centering on its network infrastructure and the compo-
nents sureptitiously installed on each zombie [2, 6, 4].
Our work expands upon this research, analyzing in depth
the functionality related to Koobface’s spread in both
Facebook and Twitter, the ease at which the botnet re-
covers from takedown, and the techniques employed by
the botnet to confound both security researchers and so-
cial network operators.
3 The Koobface Botnet
The Koobface botnet, which first appeared in late
2008 [11], has evolved into a complex system that preys
on social networking sites as its primary means of prop-
agation. The infection chain, described in Figure 1, be-
gins with an unsuspecting victim browsing Facebook or
Twitter being sent a message from a user they believe to
be a friend. In truth, this user is either a compromised
account that fell for one of Koobface’s scams or a fraud-
ulent account generated by Koobface to automatically
befriended victims. Each Koobface message includes a
malicious URL obfuscated by shortening services such
as bit.ly or wrapped by an innocuous website includ-
ing Google Reader and Blogger. Clicking on the URL
initiates an elaborate chain of redirection that includes
a compromised redirector and zombie webhost until a
victim is finally presented with a spoofed YouTube or
Facebook page that attempts to trick the victim into in-
stalling malware masquerading as a Flash update. Vic-
tims recruited in this manner then spam their own social
network friends, completing the propagation cycle. To
understand the individual systems that facilitate Koob-
face’s propagation, we present an overview of Koob-
face’s current infrastructure and zombie duties directly
related to spamming.
3.1 Koobface Hierarchy
Koobface consists of a two-tiered hierarchy where each
zombie connects to any one of roughly a hundred com-
promised hosts acting as C&C master servers that dis-
seminate spam instructions. These exploited hosts, oper-
ated by legitimate parties and re-purposed by Koobface,
simultaneously serve benign content along side Koob-
face C&C traffic until the host is disabled or uninfected.
Despite having the capability of operating entirely be-
hind the master servers, Koobface maintains a fixed do-
main that zombies regularly contact to report uptime
statistics and request links for spamming activity. The
remainder of zombie requests such as downloading up-
dates or querying for tasks are routed to the C&C mas-
ters. All communication between zombies and the C&C
transpires over HTTP on port 80 with only minimal use
of weak encryption.
3.2 Spamming Infrastructure
The Koobface spam chain relies on a complex system
of redirection to prevent domain blacklisting by social
networking sites. Working backwards from the chain
presented in Figure 1, externally accessible zombies
act as the final landing page for Koobface’s infection
chain where victims are deceived into downloading a
malicious executable. Due to the unpredictable uptime
of these zombies, a compromised webserver with high
availability acts as a front end. Once accessed, the web-
server iterates through twenty zombie IPs updated daily
by the C&C in search of an operational zombie, redirect-
ing victims to the zombie. These redirects trigger only
if a browser has both Flash and JavaScript enabled, pre-
venting lightweight crawlers from proceeding along the
redirect chain.
With only a limited number of compromised web-
servers to act as redirectors, Koobface circumvents do-
main blacklisting services by obfuscating URLs be-
fore spamming them to social networks. Using content
automatically generated on sites such as Blogger and
Google Reader, Koobface presents social network op-
erators with well known domains that do not appear in
blacklists, but whose content contains a redirect to one of
Koobface’s webservers. Links to these posts can in turn
be obfuscated with shortening services such as bit.ly, al-
lowing Koobface to present social networks with thou-
sands of constantly updated URLs which ultimately re-
solve to a limited number of zombies serving malware.
3.3 Zombie Duties
Due to safety measures put in place by social network
operators, success of the Koobface propagation cam-
paign hinges on obtaining fresh user accounts and ma-
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Figure 1: Koobface spamming infrastructure. Social network users are redirected through multiple layers of obfusca-
tion until finally being presented a malicious executable to install.
licious URLs. To accomplish both tasks, zombie ma-
chines continuously poll the C&C for various duties in-
cluding automated account creation, URL spamming,
URL obfuscation, and Captcha solving. While Koob-
face operates on multiple social networking sites, we
found the default zombie functionality targets Facebook
for which we provide an overview.
Account Generation: One of the primary tasks of each
zombie is to generate and maintain fraudulent Facebook
accounts. A zombie will regularly query the C&C for lo-
gin credentials to Facebook, obtaining either a command
REG, to register a new account, or ADD, to login to an
existing account. During registration, the C&C will pro-
vide a zombie with a randomly generated Facebook pro-
file that includes a personal photo, birthday, background,
and interests. The zombie will also be instructed to join
multiple social groups based on keywords such as Harry
Potter, Twilight, and other popular references to help it
masquerade as a legitimate account.
For an existing account, a zombie will be tasked with
acquiring new friends. To form a relationship with a
user, Facebook first requires the user accept a friend re-
quest. The zombie will send multiple requests to random
Facebook members, in turn accepting any requests made
by Facebook members who have mistaken the fraudulent
account as a legitimate user. Once complete, the zombie
reports back to the C&C with the account’s statistics. By
acquiring hundreds of friends, a zombie paves the way
for sending spam to victims.
URL Obfuscation: In order to obfuscate Koobface
URLs, zombies are tasked with creating both Blogger
and Google Reader accounts to act as redirectors. When
creating a blog, a zombie will fetch the latest news head-
lines and generate a post containing a JavaScript redirect
to a Koobface webserver. Similarly for Google Reader, a
zombie creates a page containing an RSS feed provided
by the C&C with an embedded redirect. The result-
ing links for both services are reported to the C&C, in
turn obfuscated by bit.ly, and distributed to zombies for
spamming. A more extensive treatment of Koobface’s
use of obfuscation is provided in Section 6.
Spamming Friends: To infect new hosts, zombies reg-
ularly query the C&C for malicious URLs to send to
a Facebook account’s friends. A Facebook account is
acquired either from an infected user’s machine, using
the system’s cookies, or provided by the C&C. Prior to
spamming a URL, a zombie will first query Facebook
to determine if the link is blacklisted. Non-blacklisted
URLs will be spammed to all of an account’s friends,
while blacklisted URLs will be skipped and a new spam
URL requested.
Captcha Solving: Generating Blogger, Facebook, and
Reader accounts along with Gmail accounts used to
register for each service requires a constant stream of
solved Captchas. As described in an earlier report,
Koobface pushes Captcha solving onto zombie machine
users, requiring the user to input a Captcha solution un-
der (false) threat of restarting the machine [4]. When a
zombie registering for services encounters a Captcha, it
sends a request to the C&C along with the image to be
solved. Other zombie machines regularly poll the C&C
for Captchas requiring solutions, subsequently deceiv-
ing users into solving the request and reporting the solu-
tion to the C&C.
4 Methodology
Our monitoring effort of the Koobface botnet consists of
three components. The first is a manually constructed
script that emulates zombie behavior, joining the Koob-
face botnet and polling the C&C for work. The second
component targets social networking websites, logging
into fraudulent accounts previously created by Koob-
face to monitor spamming and the efficiency of acquir-
ing new friends. Finally, we regularly poll the Koobface
C&C, compromised redirectors, and zombie webhosts
to identify update cycles and uptime statistics.
4.1 Botnet Infiltration
Where previous approaches to botnet infiltration have re-
lied on running live zombie samples in network sand-
boxes [10, 13, 9], we adopt an alternative approach
whereby zombie behavior is reproduced by an emula-
tor, similar to previous work in botnet detection and
tracking [1, 20]. The emulator replicates communication
a zombie would normally send to the Koobface C&C,
while all other hostile traffic that would negatively im-
pact the outside world remains unemulated. To construct
our emulator, we acquired a number of malware executa-
bles from Koobface spam present in Facebook and Twit-
ter, running each sample in a live virtual environment to
observe Koobface’s behavior. We seeded each infection
with various social networking accounts and browsers,
attempting to illicit a different response from Koobface
for each system environment. We ran through each pos-
sible combination of:
• cookie = {facebook,twitter,none}
• browser = {ie,firefox}
• user activity = {actively browsing, dormant}
repeating each infection multiple times and storing the
resulting packet traces. Zombie requests to the C&C
were manually identified from the traces and subse-
quently replicated in our emulator, while all other traf-
fic was ignored. The only instance of encryption in the
packet traces appeared during requests to the C&C for
login and password details to fraudulent Facebook ac-
counts. To recover the decryption function, we reverse
engineered the portion of a Koobface binary containing
the decryption code and reimplemented the functionality
in our emulator.
While construction of our Koobface emulator was
tedious, the result is a functioning zombie capable of
interacting with the C&C without any requirement of
network sandboxing. Our fake zombie can simultane-
ously emulate multiple Koobface infections, replicating
Twitter, Facebook, Blogger, and Gmail spam behavior
which would normally require a unique infection for
each tasks. Furthermore, we can run the emulator at ac-
celerated rates compared to a typical zombie by remov-
ing all timer delays, allowing us to hone in on particu-
larly interesting behavior.
One consequence of emulation is the need to update
our system with each modification to the C&C protocol.
During the course of our monitoring, we witnessed six
updates to Koobface’s spamming modules which added
functionality to interacting with Facebook and improve-
ments to the websever, though only one required an up-
date to our emulator due to modifying the network pro-
tocol to include new commands. Sandboxing techniques
face the same challenge of keeping pace with updates,
requiring new network filters for each zombie iteration.
As such, we do not feel the requirement of manual up-
dates detracts from the benefits of zombie emulation.
4.2 Social Monitoring
To understand the impact that Koobface has on so-
cial networks, our monitoring infrastructure includes a
crawler targeting Twitter and Facebook. On Twitter, we
regularly search for Koobface spam strings and URLs
discovered from interacting with the C&C, maintaining
a list of infected accounts propagating Koobface spam.
Once a Koobface Twitter account is identified, we track
the account over time to measure the rate spam is sent
and the average length of infection.
Due to Facebook’s closed nature, the same monitoring
techniques are not possible. However, using fraudulent
Facebook accounts created by Koobface, we access each
account and store its history of sent spam messages and
the account’s number of friends. The result of both ap-
proaches is a broad understanding of Koobface’s social
network activity from the vantage point of infected and
fraudulent accounts.
4.3 Redirector Monitoring
The final component of our Koobface monitoring infras-
tructure targets the redirector chain of malicious URLs.
Using spam URLs obtained from Koobface’s C&C, we
regularly poll the uptime of compromised webservers
acting as redirectors and zombies hosting malware, mea-
suring the growth and decay of Koobface’s infrastruc-
ture. We extend this monitoring to include Koobface’s
C&C, identifying the frequency that C&C servers are
shut down or move.
4.4 Dataset
Each monitoring component was executed over a month
long period from January 27, 2010 through February
27, 2010. In total, we collected data from over 300
C&C servers, 4000 zombies severing as webhosts, and
1300 compromised domains acting as redirectors. In ad-
dition to the botnet’s infrastructure, our data set con-
sists of 942 fraudulent Facebook accounts provided by
Koobface for spamming and 247 compromised Twit-
ter accounts identified through crawling, each contain-
ing records of spam activity from November 2009 on
through February 2010.
5 Analysis
We now present the results of our monitoring effort of
the Koobface botnet, first examining properties about
Koobface’s infrastructure before exploring Koobface’s
spamming activity and the techniques it employs to gen-
erate new accounts.
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Figure 2: Number of compromised hosts per day acting
as C&C servers and redirectors.
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Figure 3: CDF of the lifetime of compromised hosts
acting as redirectors.
5.1 Koobface Infrastructure
Koobface’s reliance on compromised hosts for both
C&C servers, spam redirectors, and zombies requires
constant upkeep from the botnet controllers. As hosts
become discovered and taken down, new hosts must be
compromised to replenish lost resources. By measur-
ing this daily churn, we find that Koobface controllers
readily obtain new compromised domains to serve in
the C&C and as redirectors, while a constant number of
zombie webhosts remain available.
Command & Control Morphology: To discover and
monitor Koobface’s C&C infrastructure, we regularly
emulated zombie requests to the C&C for software up-
dates. For load balancing purposes, the Koobface C&C
is a fully-connected graph where each master server is
aware of every other master server. Each request to a
C&C servers results in our emulator being forwarded to
a second C&C to serve the request. By repeatedly query-
ing each C&C server on a daily basis, we can walk the
C&C graph, identifying new hosts and the absence of
old hosts.
Over the course of our monitoring, we identified
323 compromised hosts acting as transient C&C mas-
ter servers, with each server averaging a lifetime of 11
days before going silent to our update requests. De-
spite the decay rate, Koobface maintains an average of
97 operational servers at any time, shown in Figure 2,
exhibiting an ease of obtaining new compromised hosts
to participate in the C&C. During this same period, the
fixed domain Koobface uses for reporting uptime statis-
tics and acquiring account credentials never changed IPs
and was consistently available.
Compromised Redirector Lifetime: Koobface’s prop-
agation campaign hinges on having highly available
compromised webservers to redirect victims to malware.
To discover the frequency that new domains are compro-
mised, we polled the Koobface C&C hourly with our
emulator to discover new redirector URLs that would
otherwise be posted in spam. In total we identified 1802
redirector URLs served on 1390 distinct domains. On
average, we discovered 20 new redirectors each day,
with the total number available on any day shown in Fig-
ure 2.
To understand the susceptibility of redirectors to dis-
covery and take down, we monitored the delay between
the C&C advertising a new URL to the time the page is
removed, shown in Figure 3. We found that fewer than
50% of compromised redirectors are operational for 11
days. During this period of availability, compromised
hosts were re-seeded each day with a new set of zombies
to forward visitors, allowing each redirector to maintain
an up to date list of newly infected zombies while re-
moving machines that have become uninfected.
Zombie Lifetime: To understand the volume of zombies
serving Koobface malware, we extract the list of zombie
IPs contained in the HTML served by each compromised
redirector on an hourly basis. Over the course of moni-
toring, we identified 4,151 unique IP addresses from 80
countries used to serve malware. This does not repre-
sent the overall size of the botnet, but rather the number
of zombies converted into webhosts with potentially dy-
namic IPs.
After identifying the IP address of a zombie, we
attempt to download the malicious executable being
served at hour intervals to determine whether the zombie
is online. If at any point during the day a zombie serves
malware, we consider it to be operational. Despite iden-
tifying hundreds of new IPs each day, as shown in Fig-
ure 4, on average only 365 zombies responded to our
download requests each day, indicating new IPs may be
added even if they are inaccessible from an external net-
work, or the IPs reference dynamically located zombies
that have since switched IPs and become stale. Com-
pared to 60,000 zombie webhosts previously reported by
TrendMicro [4], our results show a severe reduction in
the number of zombies serving Koobface malware, indi-
cating either a period of severe decline or a reduction in
the number of zombies converted into functional web-
hosts.
5.2 Spamming Activity
To understand the effectiveness of Koobface’s propaga-
tion throughout social networks, we monitored its activ-
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Figure 4: Arrival rate of new zombie IPs.
Spam Statistics Facebook Twitter
Accounts in dataset 942 259
Total friends 200,515 13,001
Total messages 506 2,847
Unique messages 476 13
Total clicks 157,399 -
Table 1: Statistics for accounts participating in Koob-
face’s spam propagation.
ity throughout Facebook and Twitter. Using spam his-
tories recovered from both sites, we are able to recon-
struct an image of Koobface’s activities from November
on through February, showing reduced activity by the
botnet towards later months.
Facebook: To discover Facebook accounts used for
spamming, we regularly queried the Koobface C&C for
account credentials. From our monitoring of the Koob-
face botnet, we identified that Koobface maintains a
queue of Gmail accounts that is actively fed by zombies
registering new accounts. This queue is subsequently
accessed by other zombies tasked with either register-
ing new Facebook accounts using Gmail addresses or
for logging in to existing accounts for maintenance and
spamming. By emulating the commands sent by Face-
book workers, we recovered over 30,000 operational
Gmail accounts, of which only 990 had yet been tied
to Facebook accounts by zombies.
Before logging into these Facebook accounts, we first
verify each account is fraudulent rather than stolen to
mitigate any privacy or ethical issues. To the best of our
knowledge, Koobface does not steal passwords; it relies
on browser cookies being present from a social network-
ing site in order to hijack a real users account. Nev-
ertheless, we analyze each login to determine whether
it matches patterns present in accounts generated by
Koobface zombies. Every Koobface-generated login at
the time of our monitoring follows one of two tem-
plates. The first consists of 7-15 random lower case al-
phabetic characters, while the second consists of two to
three names separated by periods followed by two digits.
Given the difficulty in distinguishing potentially legiti-
mate accounts from the second template, we disregard
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Figure 5: Number of spam messages sent by Facebook
accounts per day.
48 logins out of caution. The remaining 942 Facebook
logins follow the first template and are assumed to be
fraudulent which we confirm upon login.
To recover spam perpetrated by Koobface, we access
each Facebook account to save its list of friends and all
previously sent messages. We manually analyze each
outbox to verify all outbound messages are spam, con-
firming the accounts were never used legitimately. The
statistics tied to these accounts can be seen in Table 1.
Each fraudulent account was able to deceive an average
of 202 users into following the bot, accumulating over
200,515 friends in total. Given that distributing a link
to friends does not imply it will be clicked, we are able
to analyze clickthrough data associated with 73% of dis-
tinct spammed links due to their obfuscation with bit.ly.
Using bit.ly’s statistical API, we found Koobface’s spam
links were clicked 137,698 times, with each link averag-
ing 474 clicks. Despite the low volume of spam sent,
Koobface accounts are still able to entice thousands of
visitors.
Of particular interest is whether the Koobface botnet
is increasing or decreasing in its activity. By using the
timestamps associated with each spam message sent, we
reconstruct a timeline of Koobface activity from Novem-
ber 2009 on through February 2010 shown in Figure 5.
The majority of spam sent appears in November of 2009,
with the frequency tapering off in later months until a
brief reprisal in January. This trend of decreased activity
after November is also mirrored in our Twitter data.
Twitter: While the majority of Koobface’s resources
are spent on Facebook, infected machines with exist-
ing Twitter cookies are re-purposed into Twitter spam-
mers. Using Koobface URLs and messages returned
by the C&C to our Twitter zombie emulator, we per-
form regular searches for these values using Twitter’s
API to identify accounts propagating Koobface spam.
These accounts can be verified as infected due to non-
Koobface messages appearing prior and during infec-
tion. Our search effort uncovered 247 infected accounts,
the details of which are summarized earlier in Table 1.
Compared to Facebook, Koobface makes no effort to ob-
fuscate URLs spammed on Twitter or vary the messages
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Figure 6: Number of spam messages sent by Twitter
accounts per day.
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Figure 7: Length of Koobface infections for Twitter ac-
counts.
posted to avoid spam filtering. Despite this fact, 2,847
messages were successfully spammed by infected Twit-
ter accounts to 13,001 friends. As URLs were not ob-
fuscated, actual clickthrough statistics are not available
from bit.ly.
Collecting the history of messages posted by infected
accounts, we are able to reconstruct a view of Koob-
face’s spamming activity in Twitter, presented in Fig-
ure 6. November and December saw the brute of Koob-
face’s activity, followed by steep drop throughout Jan-
uary and February. To understand the root of this cause,
we examined the average length a Twitter account is
abused, comparing the elapsed time between the first and
last message spammed. Figure 7 shows that while 10%
of infections last over a month, the majority of infections
last under 6 days. The drop in Twitter activity can thus
be interpreted as a failure of Koobface to acquire new
infections as older zombies become uninfected. If true,
this would also explain the decline in Facebook activity
as fewer zombies are available for spamming tasks.
6 Evading Detection
The primary defense leveled by social networking web-
sites against Koobface’s malware propagation is the use
of domain blacklisting services. In this section, we ex-
plore the limitations of blacklists due to Koobface’s use
of URL obfuscation and the general delay between a link
being spammed and it subsequent blacklisting.
Technique Sample
None http://www.compromised.ca/{path}/
bit.ly http://bit.ly/{id}
bit.ly http://{ip: binary,int,hex,octet}/{id}
Reader http://google.{tld}/reader/shared/{id}
Blogger http://{screen name}.blogspot.com/
Table 2: Obfuscation techniques employed by Koob-
face.
Blacklist Number Detected Detection Rate
Google 144 26.71%
SURBL 31 5.70%
Joewein 0 0.00%
Table 3: Blacklist detection rate for URLs spammed by
Koobface
6.1 Obfuscation Techniques
To prevent the spread of malicious URLs, both Twitter
and Facebook rely on blacklists to identify and block
suspicious domains; Twitter uses Google’s Safebrows-
ing API [12], while Facebook relies on its own propri-
etary blacklist [17]. To evade blacklist detection, Koob-
face will employ any one of multiple obfuscation tech-
niques, presented in Table 2. By using blogs, RSS
feeds, and shortened URLs that forward users to com-
promised redirectors, Koobface masks domains known
to host malware with sites that have yet to be black-
listed. Over the course of one week monitoring Koob-
face’s obfuscation activity, our emulator recovered 3,052
bit.ly URLs spammed by Koobface that resolved to only
113 compromised redirectors. In addition, our emula-
tor recovered 30,193 Gmail accounts used for generating
malicious blogs and RSS feeds. To confirm Koobface’s
obfuscation techniques negate blacklists, we gathered
500 URLs blacklisted by both Twitter and Facebook and
shortened each with bit.ly before resubmitting each link
to check on its blacklist status. For both sites, all 500
links went unflagged as malicious, requiring both sites
to eventually update their blacklists to detect the ma-
licious URLs. While bit.ly disables links to malicious
pages using its own blacklists derived from Google and
SURBL [5], using bit.ly negates the blacklists employed
by Twitter and Facebook. Unless Facebook and Twitter
update their services to resolve URL redirects to identify
a link’s final landing page, obfuscation will continue to
pose a threat to social network defenses.
6.2 Blacklist Delay
The reliance of social networks on blacklist for identify-
ing malicious content requires blacklists to quickly up-
date in response to threats. To measure blacklist delay,
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Figure 8: CDF of the delay between a URL being
spammed and its subsequent blacklisting.
we monitored the time between a new URL being ad-
vertised for spamming and its subsequent appearance in
three blacklist services: Google Safebrowsing, SURBL,
and Joewein. Using a dataset of 544 previously un-
spammed compromised redirectors that were not black-
listed when our test began, we monitored each domain’s
blacklist status from the time it was first distributed by
the Koobface C&C for spamming. The overall detec-
tion rate from our test can be seen in Table 3. The fail-
ure of SURBL and Joewein to identify Koobface’s mali-
cious URLs is likely a result of their use of email to seed
blacklists, while Koobface exclusively targets social net-
works. Google performs the best of all blacklists, but
over 73% of all malicious links went undetected.
The delay in detection for Google Safebrowsing can
be seen in Figure 8, which shows 50% of links were de-
tected in under two days. Conversely, 50% of links that
have yet to be detected have been in our system over
25 days. To understand how quickly blacklists must re-
spond, we examined the clickthrough statistics provided
by bit.ly for URLs spammed in Facebook. Due to re-
quiring manual analysis, we selected a random sample
of 75 URLs from the 290 URLs spammed by fraudu-
lent Facebook accounts. Clickthrough rates exhibited
a power law distribution, with 55% of clicks appear-
ing on average within the first day and 81% of clicks
within the first two days, before tapering out into a long
tail. Assuming the distribution of clicks remains con-
stant for each Koobface URL spammed, blacklists must
respond to threats within 2 days to protect the major-
ity of users. Of the 144 URLs blacklisted by Google,
only 74 blacklistings occurred within 48 hours, 13% of
all URLs spammed by Koobface. Even in the absence
of obfuscation techniques used by Koobface, simply us-
ing Google’s Safebrowsing API, SURBL, or Joewein is
ineffective in stemming the spread of Koobface.
7 Conclusion
As millions of users continue to flock to online social
networks, sites such as Facebook and Twitter are be-
coming increasingly attractive targets for spam, phish-
ing, and malware. The Koobface botnet in particular has
honed its efforts to exploit social network users, lever-
aging zombies to generate accounts, befriend victims,
and to send spam. Despite defenses put in place by so-
cial network operators, domain blacklisting remains in-
effective at quickly identifying malicious URLs, taking
on average 4 days to respond to threats, while 81% of
users visit Koobface URLs within 2 days. To stem the
threat of Koobface and the rise of social malware, social
networks must advance their defenses beyond blacklists
and actively search for Koobface content, potentially us-
ing infiltration as a means of early detection.
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